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Recent Developments

Sippio v. State

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the state
medical examiner may testify as to
a murder victim's manner of death
when the medical examiner's
autopsy report, which notes
manner of death, has been
admitted into evidence. Sippio v.
State, 350 Md. 633, 714 A.2d 864
(1998). The court also held that a
criminal defendant may not
present character evidence of his
truthfulness
without
first
testifying, or, in the alternative,
without requesting to vary the
order of proof, and making a
binding proffer of his intention to
testify. The ruling sets forth a new
trend because the court had never
considered the admissibility of a
medical
examiner's
opmIOn
testimony as to manner of death.
On December 30, 1995,
Dwayne Sippio ("Sippio") fired a
shot that killed Brenda Branch
("Branch"). Although Sippio
confessed to the shooting, he
maintained that it was an accident.
At trial, the court admitted into
evidence the victim's autopsy
report prepared by Dr. John
Smialek, Chief Medical Examiner
for the State of Maryland which
stated the victim's manner of
death. In its case-in-chief, the
prosecution offered Dr. Smialek's
testimony that Branch's manner of
death was homicide.
Sippio
objected, contending that Dr.
Smialek's testimony was improper
as it resolved an ultimate legal
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issue reserved for the jury. The
trial court overruled the objection
and allowed the testimony. Sippio
additionally sought to introduce
testimony as to his character for
truthfulness
without
first
testifying. The court sustained the
state's objection to the testimony
and excluded the evidence.
Sippio was convicted in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City of
second degree murder, felonious
use of a handgun, and unlawfully
wearing, carrying, and transporting
a handgun. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, in a per
curium opinion, affirmed the
conviction. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland affirmed that ruling
after carefully considering the role
of expert testimony, the procedure
for offering character evidence
under the common law, and the
Maryland Rules of Evidence.

The court of appeals addressed
the admissibility of a medical
examiner's testimony as to a
murder victim's manner of death
by reviewing an earlier decision
where the court considered the
admissibility of a death certificate
that
contained
a
medical
examiner's written opinion as to
manner of death. Sippio, 350 Md.
at 645, 714 A.2d at 870. In
Benjamin v. Woodring, 268 Md.
593, 303 A.2d 779 (1973), the
court held that the manner of death
portion of the death certificate was
inadmissible because it contained
"such non-factual information as
'indications,
inferences,
or
conclusions drawn by the
certificate maker that did not
qualify
as
'essential facts
concerning the medical causes of
death.'" Sippio, 350 Md. at 64445, 714 A.2d at 870 (quoting
Benjamin, 268 Md. at 606, 608,
303 A.2d at 787, 788). Sippio
argued that the Benjamin court's
holding should be extended to
preclude a medical examiner from
testifying concerning manner of
death. Id. at 645, 714 A.2d at 870.
Before
distinguishing
Benjamin from the instant case,
however, the court of appeals first
examined Health General Article
of the Annotated Code of
Maryland, section 5-301 et seq.,
which establishes the procedures a
medical examiner must follow
when a death results from suicide,
homicide, or accident. !d. The
court noted that the 1990
29.1 U. Balt. L.F. 75
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amendment to section 5-311 added
the words "manner of death" to the
list of items the medical examiner
must include in an autopsy report.
Id at 646, 714 A.2d at 871. The
court reasoned, therefore, that "[t]o
create a per se rule prohibiting
such testimony would be akin to
holding that medical examiners are
not qualified to determine manner
of death, or that medical
examiners' findings are generally
unreliable evidence in a court of
law." Id. at 647, 714 A.2d at 871.
In differentiating Benjamin
from the instant case, the court
reviewed Terry v. State, 34 Md.
App. 99, 366 A.2d 65 (1976),
where the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland upheld the
admissibility of a medical
examiner's opinion testimony as to
manner of death. Sippio, 350 Md.
at 647, 714 A.2d at 871. In Terry,
which was decided prior to the
1990 amendment to section 5-311,
the court held that despite the
Benjamin court's suggestion that a
medical examiner's investigative
duties were limited by law to
essential facts concerning the
medical causes of death, "'we
cannot conceive that this precludes
calling the medical examiner as an
expert witness to express his
opinion in a case.'" Id. at 647-48,
714 A.2d at 871 (quoting Terry, 34
Md. App. at 107-08, 366 A.2d at
70). Adopting the court's rational
in Terry, the court held that
Benjamin was inapposite to the
instant case and that testimony
concerning manner of death was
appropriate. !d. at 648, 714 A.2d
at 872. Additionally, the court
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 76

noted that when Benjamin was
training
and
professional
decided, "determining manner of experience qualified him to testify
death was merely 'incumbent upon
as an expert; (2) the subject matter
[medical examiners] in completing
was appropriate for expert
the [death certificate] form.''' Id
testimony because Dr. Smialek
at 647, 714 A.2d at 871 (quoting
clearly described the fatal gunshot
wound in terms understandable to
Benjamin, 268 Md. at 609, 303
the jury; and (3) a legally
A.2d at 788). Accordingly, the
sufficient factual basis existed to
court declined Sippio's request to
support the testimony because Dr.
prohibit the medical examiner's
testimony regarding manner of Smialek performed the autopsy
and reviewed the facts surrounding
death. Id. at 648, 714 A.2d at 872.
the shooting. Id. at 649-53, 714
After determining that the
A.2d at 872-74.
The court
subject of the testimony was
concluded, therefore, that Dr.
appropriate, the court looked to
Smialek's testimony as to manner
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-702
and found that the admissibility of of death was a proper subject for
expert testimony depends on
expert testimony. Id. at 652, 714
whether it would aid the trier of A.2d at 874.
The court also rejected
fact in understanding the evidence
Sippio's assertion that Dr.
or in determining a fact in issue.
Smialek's testimony concerning
Id at 649, 714 A.2d at 872. The
the victim's manner of death was a
court found that Dr. Smialek's
testimony aided the jury's
legal conclusion reserved for the
understanding when he explained jury. Id at 653, 714 A.2d at 874.
that homicide was the killing of The court determined that the
ultimate issue was not whether
one human being by another,
Branch's death was a homicide,
regardless of intent, and that a
but whether the shooting was
medical exammer does not
accidental or deliberate. Id. at 655,
consider the intent of the suspect
when investigating the manner of 714 A.2d at 875. The court found
death. Id at 652, 656, 714 A.2d at . that Dr. Smialek's testimony as to
874, 875. The court noted that
manner of death did not address
Sippio's intent and was, therefore,
without Dr. Smialek's testimony,
appropriate. Id. at 654, 714 A.2d
the jurors might have given the
word "homicide" a "degree of at 875. The court cautioned,
however, that its holding was
culpability greater than its
limited to the situation where a
definition allows." Id.
medical examiner's report was
The court analyzed Dr.
properly admitted into evidence,
Smialek's
testimony
and
and not where a report's
determined that it met the three
admissibility was contested. !d. at
requirements outlined in Maryland
656, 714 A.2d at 875. Sippio
Rule 5-702. Id. at 649, 714 A.2d
waived the latter issue, according
at 872. In so doing, the court
to the court, when he did not
found that: (1) Dr. Smialek's
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object to the introduction of the
medical examiner's report into
evidence. Id.
In addressing the second issue
concerning character evidence, the
court
examined
specific
circumstances
under
which
character evidence is permissible.
Id. at 663, 714 A.2d at 879. The
court
first
affirmed
the
requirement that a criminal
defendant must testify before
presenting character evidence for
truthfulness. Id. at 664, 714 A.2d
at 879. In so doing, the court
found that a defendant's promise
to testify during opening argument
was not binding, and therefore,
failed to meet the requirement. Id.
at 665, 714 A.2d at 880. The court
next looked to Maryland Rule of
Evidence 5-608, and agreed that a
defendant's
character
for
truthfulness first must be attacked
before a witness may offer
testimony
supporting
the
defendant's
character
for
truthfulness. Id. at 663, 714 A.2d
at 879. The court then reviewed
Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304, 653
A.2d 452 (1995), which held that a
criminal defendant may offer
character evidence for truthfulness
without the prosecution first
attacking
the
defendant's
character. Sippio, 350 Md. at 662,
714 A.2d at 879. The court in
Sahin reasoned that because the
defendant was charged with a
character impeaching offense, the
charge alone represented a
sufficient attack on the defendant's
character. Id. at 663, 714 A.2d at
879. However, the court in Sippio
noted that the key to Sahin was

that a defendant must still testify in
order to present the character
evidence. Id. at 664, 714 A.2d at
879.
To permit a criminal
defendant to present character
evidence without first testifying,
the court reasoned, allows the
defendant to support his or her
good character for truthfulness
without first placing that character
trait at issue. Id. The court,
however, noted that Maryland
Rules 5-104(b) and 5-611(a)
permit a judge to vary the order in
which a defendant presents
evidence, thereby allowing a
defendant to present character
evidence before testifying. Id. at
665, 714 A.2d at 880. However, a
defendant must make a binding
announcement that he will testify.
Id.
In Sippio v. State, the court held
that opinion testimony by a
medical examiner as to manner of
death is appropriate to supplement
a properly admitted medical
examiner's report. This places an
undue burden on a defendant who
must overcome a seemingly
irrebuttable presumption when
testimony is admitted that the
victim's manner of death was
homicide. A special instruction to
the jury to consider the testimony
only for its medical relevance, and
not as conclusive evidence of the
defendant's intent, may provide
the defendant with some leverage
against the testimony. Another
option is to object to the
introduction of the medical
examiner's report and seek to have
the testimony similarly excluded.
As the court here seems to have

limited the introduction of a
medical examiner's testimony to
instances where the medical
examiner's report is admitted into
evidence, such an objection may
prevent the opinion testimony
from being introduced into
evidence.

29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 77

